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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
Margetts first appealed from the final judgment, dated April 23, 1990, of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. On February 20, 1992, the Court of 
Appeals remanded the case to the District Court. A new final judgment was entered by the 
District Court on January 11, 1993. Notice of Appeal was filed February 10, 1993. On 
July 14, 1993, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE I DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOLLOW THIS COURT'S 
MANDATE TO ENTER SUBSIDIARY FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON AGENCY AND FRAUD AND TO 
CLARIFY ITS RULING AS TO FORFEITURE AND RENT? 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court followed this Court's 
mandate may be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. 
ISSUE II DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINE THAT GERALD 
SNOW HAD NO ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND 
AMERICAN SAVINGS TO THE TERMS OF THE TWENTY PERCENT 
AGREEMENT? 
Standard of Review: This court must uphold the trial court's factual 
findings unless appellant, after marshalling all the evidence supporting the 
findings, is then able to demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light most 
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
trial court's findings such that those findings are clearly erroneous. Due 
regard should be given to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); 
-ix-
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Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 216 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (Utah App. 1993); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
ISSUE III DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDE THAT 
AMERICAN SAVINGS WAS NOT A PARTY TO OR OTHERWISE 
BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT? 
Standard of Review: The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the 
agreements were complete and unambiguous on their face. See Morris v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983) ("whether 
a contract is ambiguous is a question of law which the court must decide"). 
The trial court's legal conclusion that the agreements were complete and 
unambiguous is reviewed under the correction of error standard. State v. 
Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Utah App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The trial court's ruling that American Savings did not 
assume Terrace Falls' liabilities involved mixed issues of law and fact; the 
legal conclusions involved in this ruling are subject to review under the 
correction of error standard while the factual findings are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 n.7 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
ISSUE IV DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINE THAT NO 
FRAUD OR OTHER IMPROPER CONDUCT WAS COMMITTED 
WHICH WOULD PERMIT MARGETTS TO RESCIND HIS 
AGREEMENT WITH AMERICAN SAVINGS OR THE RELEASE OF 
HIS LIEN ON THE TERRACE FALLS PROJECT? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's factual findings regarding fraud 
must be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous. Doelle, 784 P.2d at 1178; 
Slattery, 216 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. 
ISSUE V WAS IT PROPER TO AWARD RENT AND DECLARE A FORFEITURE 
OF MARGETTS' RIGHTS TO THE CONDOMINIUM WHERE 
MARGETTS WRONGFULLY RETAINED POSSESSION OF THE 
PROPERTY AFTER REFUSING TO HONOR THE PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions may be 
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1300. 
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ISSUE VI IS A DISAFFIRMING BUYER WHO WRONGFULLY RETAINS 
POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AFTER A DEMAND TO VACATE 
LIABLE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions may be 
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1300. 
ISSUE VII WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF FAIR RENTAL VALUE 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE? 
Standard of Review: This Court must uphold the trial court's findings 
regarding fair rental value unless they are clearly erroneous. Doelle, 784 P.2d 
at 1178; Slattery, 216 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. 
ISSUE VIII 
A. DID NEW WEST COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE? 
B. IS MARGETTS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THIS ISSUE ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE HE FAILED TO ASSERT THE DEFENSE IN 
THE TRIAL COURT? 
Standard of Review: If this Court reaches the merits, the trial court's 
legal conclusions may be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil, 
815 P.2d at 1300. 
ISSUE IX DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES 
TO NEW WEST? 
Standard of Review: If this Court reaches the merits, the trial court's 
legal conclusions may be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil, 
815 P.2d at 1300. 
ISSUE X DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARD PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST TO NEW WEST? 
Standard of Review: If this Court reaches the merits, the trial court's 
legal conclusions may be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. Vigil, 
815 P.2d at 1300. 
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STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
§ 78-36-3, Utah Code Annotated 
(See p. 28 for full text). 
-xii-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
New West agrees with Margetts' statement of the nature of the case. 
Course of the Proceedings 
New West agrees with Margetts' statement of the course of the proceedings. 
Disposition in Lower Court 
On remand, the parties prepared and submitted to the court detailed 
submissions in support of proposed supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Both parties' submissions contained numerous references to the trial transcript and to case 
authorities. New West's additional submissions appear at R. 705-829; Margetts' submissions 
appear at R. 551-703. The court heard oral argument on supplemental findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on September 28, 1992. A transcript of the hearing, including the 
Court's bench ruling, appears at R. 888-932. The court entered its Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Supplemental Findings") on October 26, 1992, at R. 851-
862. A copy of the Supplemental Findings is attached hereto as Addendum A. The 
Supplemental Findings incorporated the court's earlier Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law ("Findings"), which appear at R. 512-524. A copy of the Findings is attached hereto as 
Addendum B. On January 11, 1993, the court entered a new final judgment in favor of New 
West, at R. 872-874. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Margetts owned a condominium in Park City which he traded in 1981 for the 
right to receive another condominium in a project to be built in Salt Lake City (the 
"Project"). (Tr. 26, 30.) Margetts obtained a lien against the Project to secure his right to 
receive the new condominium. {Id.) 
In 1981, Gerald Snow began serving as counsel for Terrace Falls 
Condominiums Partnership ("Terrace Falls"), which owned the Project. (Tr. 25.) As 
attorney for Terrace Falls, Snow drafted the original condominium purchase agreement 
between Margetts and Terrace Falls. (Tr. 33-34.) 
In December 1981, Snow represented Terrace Falls in obtaining a construction 
loan for the Project from New West's predecessor, American Savings. (Tr. 26-31.) As part 
of his efforts to help Terrace Falls obtain the construction loan, Snow met with Margetts and 
his attorney, Ralph Marsh, and obtained the subordination of Margetts' lien to the 
construction financing. (Tr. 29-33.) On that occasion, Snow advised Margetts and Marsh 
that he was representing Terrace Falls. (Tr. 31-32, 109-111.) 
When Terrace Falls defaulted on the construction loan in 1984, Snow, in his 
capacity as attorney for Terrace Falls, began negotiating a loan workout with American 
Savings. (Tr. 36-41.) American Savings retained the local firm Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell as counsel in these negotiations. (Tr. 39-40, 59, 283.) 
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In September of 1984, American Savings agreed to accept a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure from Terrace Falls provided that Terrace Falls could deliver free and clear title 
to the Project. (Tr. 39-41, 49, Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 9.) To clear title, Snow began 
negotiating with Terrace Falls' lien creditors, including Margetts, to obtain lien releases. 
(Tr. 39, 53, 56-59.) Because Terrace Falls was insolvent, American Savings agreed to front 
the costs of reaching settlements with the lien holders. (Tr. 49; Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 4, p. 8, 
1 4.E.) 
Snow first contacted Margetts regarding the 1984 negotiations through a letter 
to Marsh dated September 7, 1984. (Tr. 56; Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 5.) The letter, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Addendum C, explained that Terrace Falls was attempting to 
negotiate a deed in lieu of foreclosure with American Savings and that such an arrangement 
would require "an acceptable settlement with all the junior lienholders." (Id.) The letter 
identified Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell as local counsel for American Savings. (Id.) 
Nothing in the letter suggested that Snow was representing anyone other than Terrace Falls. 
(Id.) 
The following week, Margetts and Marsh attended a meeting with Terrace 
Falls and American Savings at the offices of Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, American 
Savings' local counsel. (Tr. 60, 244, 264.) During the meeting, Snow informed Margetts 
that if American Savings foreclosed on the Project, Margetts would receive nothing and his 
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lien position would be wiped out. (Tr. 61.) Snow offered Margetts $30,000 for a release of 
his lien on the Project, but Margetts rejected the offer. {Id.) 
During the ensuing negotiations, which culminated in November, 1984, Snow 
never told Margetts or Marsh that he was representing American Savings. (Tr. 79-80, 109-
111.) Margetts and Marsh both admit this fact. (Tr. 248, 266.) Margetts also admits that 
he never inquired as to whom Snow was representing. {Id.) During the negotiations, 
Margetts' only contact with American Savings was the initial September meeting at Kirton, 
McConkie & Bushnell. (Tr. 244-47.) No one at that meeting told Margetts that Snow was 
representing American Savings. (Tr. 248.) 
Throughout the fall of 1984, Snow negotiated settlements and releases with 
Terrace Falls' lien creditors. (Tr. 53.) Snow also drafted the settlement agreements and 
obtained signatures on the settlement documents from Terrace Falls' lien creditors. {Id.) 
Throughout these negotiations, Snow represented only Terrace Falls. (Tr. 55.) In engaging 
in those activities, Snow was serving the interests of Terrace Falls, which directly benefited 
from the transaction by avoiding the adverse consequences of a foreclosure. (Supp. 
Findings, f LA. 12.) Snow never intended to represent American Savings, nor did he believe 
that he was representing American Savings in these negotiations. (Tr. 80.) Snow assumed 
that Margetts knew that he continued to represent Terrace Falls, not American Savings. 
(Tr. 110.) 
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Ultimately, Margetts was offered a nonrefundable $150,000 credit towards the 
purchase of a condominium in the Project in return for Margetts' release of his lien on the 
Project. Margetts accepted this offer. (Tr. 66.) To consummate that agreement, Margetts 
and American Savings executed a Condominium Purchase Agreement (Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 7; 
attached hereto as Addendum D), a General Release (Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 8), and a Request 
for Reconveyance (Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 9). By these documents, Margetts agreed to purchase 
a condominium, American Savings granted Margetts a nonrefundable $150,000.00 credit 
towards the purchase, and Margetts released his lien on the Project. (Id.) 
When Margetts executed the above agreements, he also executed an agreement 
with Terrace Falls called the "Twenty Percent Agreement" (Defendant's Trial Ex. 10; 
attached hereto as Addendum E). American Savings was not a party to the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. (Id.) It provided that Margetts was entitled to twenty percent of any proceeds 
from the Project that Terrace Falls might receive after executing the Deed in Lieu 
Agreement. The purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement was to permit Margetts to 
participate in any windfall profits the Project developers might receive after American 
Savings took over the Project. (Tr. 70.) 
Snow did not state to Margetts that American Savings would become Terrace 
Falls or would otherwise succeed to Terrace Falls' legal duties under the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. (Tr. 136-137.) American Savings' representatives were not involved in the 
negotiation or execution of the Twenty Percent Agreement, and never represented to 
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Margetts that American Savings would be bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
(Tr. 71, 140.) 
Throughout the time he was negotiating lien creditor settlements for Terrace 
Falls, Snow sent to American Savings or its attorneys, for their review and approval, drafts 
of all settlement documents that he believed would create a legal obligation on the part of 
American Savings. (Tr. 82.) Snow never presented the Twenty Percent Agreement to 
American Savings for final review and approval. Snow did not intend that agreement to 
create a legal duty on the part of American Savings. (Tr. 71, 140.) Neither American 
Savings nor its attorneys saw the Twenty Percent Agreement before it was executed by 
defendant Margetts and Terrace Falls. (Tr. 71, 286.) American Savings never ratified the 
Twenty Percent Agreement, nor did American Savings or New West agree to accept Terrace 
Falls' liabilities under the Twenty Percent Agreement. (Supp. Findings f I.A. 19.) 
American Savings never gave Snow permission to enter into any agreements on behalf of 
American Savings. (Tr. 285-286). 
Because Terrace Falls lacked funds to pay Snow's attorney's fees for his work 
on behalf of Terrace Falls to complete the construction loan workout, American Savings 
agreed to pay Snow's attorney's fees as it paid other Terrace Falls creditors. (Tr. 50 and 
51.) There was no evidence that Margetts was aware that American Savings had agreed to 
pay Snow's attorney's fees. (Supp. Findings f LA. 18.) 
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In August of 1985, Margetts took possession of Terrace Falls condominium 
number 413. In August of 1987, American Savings demanded that Margetts close on his 
purchase pursuant to the Condominium Purchase Agreement. (Tr. 179-183.) Margetts 
refused to close on the purchase and began demanding that he be given the unit without 
further payment. {Id.) On March 7, 1989, New West served Margetts with a Notice to Quit 
by certified mail in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-3 and 6. (R. 6, 32, Tr. 183.) 
On March 15, 1989, New West commenced this lawsuit alleging breach of contract and 
unlawful detainer. (R. 9.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly carried out its mandate on remand by carefully 
considering the record, entering supplemental findings and conclusions on agency and fraud 
and clarifying its reasons for declaring a forfeiture and awarding rent. The record 
overwhelmingly supports the trial court's findings that Terrace Falls' attorney had no actual 
or apparent authority to bind American Savings to the terms of the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. The trial court correctly concluded that American Savings was not a party to or 
otherwise bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement. No one told Margetts that American 
Savings would be bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement and, based upon his extensive 
dealings with Terrace Falls, Margetts could not have been mislead by any such alleged 
statements. 
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Margetts is liable for the fair rental value of the property during the period he 
wrongfully retained possession after repudiating his contract. His forfeiture of the 
$150,000.00 credit resulted solely from his own voluntary refusal to honor the purchase 
agreement. There is nothing unjust in allowing New West to recover fair rental value during 
the period it was wrongfully denied possession of its property. 
The remaining issues should be summarily affirmed in New West's favor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOLLOWED THIS COURT'S MANDATE 
ON REMAND. 
This Court's earlier decision requested elaboration of the trial court's Findings 
on the issues of agency and fraud. The Court also requested clarification on the combination 
of remedies employed by the trial court, i.e., termination of Margetts' rights under the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement coupled with an award of rent. 
At the outset, it is important to note that this Court did not in any way suggest 
that the trial court's earlier Findings were erroneous or unsupported by the evidence. The 
Court reversed only on the issue of agency, and only because it believed additional findings 
were needed: 
[W]e reverse on the issue of Snow's agency since the trial court did not 
make sufficient findings for us to review. We, therefore, remand this 
case to the trial court for additional findings, both as to the issues of 
agency and fraud, with leave to conduct such further proceedings as the 
trial court may deem appropriate. 
Memorandum Decision, pp. 5-6. 
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Every one of the trial court's Supplemental Findings is directly supported by 
the testimony and is documented by citations to the record. They are not "merely an 
exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached". This Court's 
admonition to avoid "mere bolstering" was not a direction to the trial court to arrive at a 
different result in the case. Rather, it was simply a reminder that the subsidiary findings 
must be supported by the record, as were the earlier findings. 
Initially, the trial court entered the core findings that Margetts could not have 
been wrongfully mislead in the Terrace Falls transaction because: 1) he recognized that 
American Savings was not a party to the Twenty Percent Agreement; 2) he did not ask that 
Snow's alleged representations be put in writing; 3) no one ever told him Snow had authority 
to bind American Savings; 4) he never asked whether Snow had authority to bind American 
Savings; and 5) even though he was represented by an attorney in the transaction, he chose 
not to consult the attorney regarding American Savings' role in the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. (Findings, f 1.1-26.) 
On remand, the trial court requested and received detailed submissions from 
the parties regarding proposed supplemental findings. (R. 551-703, 705-829.) After 
carefully considering these detailed submissions and hearing arguments from both sides, the 
trial court entered its Supplemental Findings, and a Bench Decision (R. 919-931) further 
explaining its reasoning. As will appear in the following sections of this brief, the 
Supplemental Findings include the "subsidiary facts" necessary to "disclose the steps by 
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which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached". Memorandum Decision, 
p. 4. In addition, the trial court clarified its reasons for declaring forfeiture and awarding 
rent. See, Section V, below. Accordingly, the trial court fully carried out this Court's 
mandate on remand. 
II. THE RECORD OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS THAT GERALD SNOW HAD NO AUTHORITY TO BIND 
AMERICAN SAVINGS TO THE TERMS OF THE TWENTY PERCENT 
AGREEMENT, 
A. The Trial Court Found that Snow Lacked Actual or Apparent Authority 
to Represent American Savings. 
Margetts challenges the trial court's extensive factual findings that Gerald 
Snow had no actual or apparent authority to bind American Savings to the terms of the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. As an appellant challenging factual findings, Margetts "faces a 
substantial burden. Trial court's findings of fact will be affirmed if they are 'based on 
sufficient evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
construction.'" Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 216 Utah Adv. Rep 26, 28 (Utah App. 1991) 
quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). To 
prevail, Margetts "'must marshall all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to 
support the findings.'" Id. (emphasis in original). Margetts "must then show that these 
same findings are 'so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, 
thus making them clearly erroneous.'" Id. at 315 (citations omitted); see also, Doelle v. 
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Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 
896, 899 (Utah 1989). Margetts has failed to carry that substantial burden. Margetts' brief 
tries to fill the evidentiary gaps with conclusions such as "Snow acted on behalf of American 
Savings" or "Snow was authorized by American Savings". The facts from the evidentiary 
record do not support these conclusions. Instead, they overwhelmingly support the trial 
court's findings of no agency. 
At most, Margetts can point to bits and pieces of evidence which hardly make 
a case of actual or apparent authority. For example, Margetts points out that Snow 
sometimes communicated American Savings' positions regarding the Terrace Falls 
transaction and that Snow sometimes delivered documents to Margetts which affected 
American Savings' interests in addition to the interests of Snow's client, Terrace Falls. 
Finally, Margetts points to the fact that American Savings, as Terrace Falls' lender, was the 
source of payment to Terrace Falls' creditors, including Snow and Margetts. Margetts does 
not contend, however, that he was aware that American Savings was the source of payment 
for Snow. 
These bits and pieces of evidence are completely overshadowed by the trial 
court's Supplemental Findings in support of its conclusion that Snow had no actual or 
apparent authority to represent American Savings: 
1. Snow had served as counsel for Terrace Falls for three years 
leading up to the transactions in question. (Supp. Findings f I.A.2.) 
s \wcb\18812 
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2. During that period, Snow represented Terrace Falls in dealings 
with Margetts, who was aware that Snow was representing Terrace Falls. 
{Id. a t t I .A .3 . ) 
3. When the negotiations began for the transaction in question, 
Snow wrote Margetts' attorney a letter identifying Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell as American Savings' counsel. Nothing in the letter suggested that 
Snow was representing anyone other than Terrace Falls. {Id. at f LA.8.) 
4. Margetts admits that no one told him that Snow was 
representing American Savings. {Id. at f LA. 10.) 
5. American Savings never gave Snow permission to enter into 
agreements on its behalf. {Id. at f LA. 17.) 
6. No one at American Savings saw the Twenty Percent Agreement 
before it was executed. {Id. at f LA. 16.) 
7. Snow never believed that he was representing American 
Savings. {Id. at 1f LA. 12.) 
8. Snow never intended to bind American Savings to the Twenty 
Percent Agreement. {Id. at 1 LA. 15.) 
These facts and others included in the trial court's Supplemental Findings (with citations to 
the record) conclusively demonstrate that no agency existed. 
s \wcb\18812 
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B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded as a Matter of Law that No Agency 
Existed. 
An agent cannot bind his principal unless the agent is acting pursuant to actual 
or apparent authority. Municipal Building Authority v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 279 (Utah 
1985). A finding of actual authority is precluded in this case because the undisputed 
evidence shows that American Savings never authorized Snow to act as its agent or attorney. 
Snow himself testified that he never intended to represent American Savings, and that he 
always represented Terrace Falls. (Tr. 55.) 
Margetts' theory of apparent authority is similarly deficient. The applicable 
case law holds that apparent authority of an agent can be inferred only from the conduct of 
the principal. In Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983) cert. den. 
sub nom. Harlan v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 466 U.S. 937 (1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that apparent authority can exist only when the principal creates an appearance of 
circumstances such that it causes a third party to reasonably and prudently believe that a 
second party has the power to act on behalf of the principal. See also, City Electric v. Dean 
Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983). 
There is no evidence of conduct by American Savings which could support a 
claim of apparent authority. Margetts admits he drew his inferences of authority solely from 
Snow's conduct. Even Snow's conduct was insufficient to justify a reasonable inference of 
authority to act for American Savings. Snow had made known to Margetts his representation 
of Terrace Falls in earlier dealings regarding the same condominium unit. Additionally, 
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Snow sent Margetts and his attorney a letter (Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 5) regarding the specific 
transaction at issue here, stating that Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell represented American 
Savings. The unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from the letter was that Snow still 
represented Terrace Falls. There is only one legal conclusion possible — Snow did not have 
apparent authority to represent American Savings. 
Finally, the law in Utah requires a person dealing exclusively with an agent to 
take reasonable steps to ascertain the agent's authority despite any representations of the 
agent. City Electric, 672 P.2d at 90. Margetts admitted that he never asked Snow if he had 
authority to represent American. Margetts admitted that he made no other inquiries as to 
Snow's authority. Margetts admitted that he merely assumed from the circumstances that 
Snow had authority. These admissions alone compel the conclusion that Snow did not have 
apparent authority to represent American. 
The cases cited in Margetts' brief do not support a legal conclusion that actual 
or apparent agency exists under the facts of this case. Most of the cases cited by Margetts 
involve facts and circumstances fundamentally different from those here. For example, 
Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980), Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 524 P.2d 
271 (Ak. 1974) and Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Comm., 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976) 
involved agents who were clearly serving as their principals' attorneys. In the present case, 
Snow was not American Savings' attorney, he was Terrace Falls' attorney. Arizona Title 
Insurance & Trust Co. v. Pace, 8 Ariz. App. 269, 445 P.2d 471 (1968), heavily relied upon 
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by Margetts, is similarly inapplicable because it involved an attorney hired by an insurance 
company to represent the insured. In this case, New West did not hire Snow to represent 
Terrace Falls. Snow had been representing Terrace Falls all along. Finally, Silver v. 
George, 618 P.2d 1157 (Haw. App. 1980) aff'd and remanded, 644 P.2d 955 (Hawaii 1982) 
merely holds that an attorney may have a duty to a third party not to draft an usurious or 
illegal agreement. There is no claim that the Twenty Percent Agreement was illegal or 
usurious. Moreover, there is no showing that Snow was American's attorney in preparing 
that document. 
in. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT AMERICAN 
SAVINGS WAS NOT A PARTY TO OR OTHERWISE BOUND BY THE 
TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT. 
A. The Condominium Purchase Agreement and the Twenty Percent 
Agreement are Unambiguous and Complete on Their Face; Nothing 
Indicates That New West is a Party to or Bound By the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. 
In an attempt to make the Twenty Percent Agreement's terms binding on New 
West, Margetts argues that the Twenty Percent Agreement and the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement should be read as a single document. This is a misapplication of basic contract 
principles. 
When interpreting contracts, courts must first look to the four corners of the 
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving v. 
Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Extrinsic evidence may not be used to explain 
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the terms of a contract that is clear on its face. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
In C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1988), the court 
gave a clear and concise definition of an ambiguous contract: 
A contract is considered ambiguous if "the words used to express the 
meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient in a sense that the 
contract may be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." 
Id. 
No provision in either the Condominium Purchase Agreement or the Twenty 
Percent Agreement is ambiguous as defined by C.J. Realty. The Twenty Percent Agreement 
is a one paragraph document. It is between Terrace Falls and Margetts only. American 
Savings is not a party. It provides that Margetts has a right to receive twenty percent of any 
proceeds received by Terrace Falls' partners after execution of the Deed in Lieu Agreement 
resulting from the sale of the Project, from the sale of any interest in the Project or from 
other type of Project profits. It provides nothing more. Likewise, the Condominium 
Purchase Agreement is a straightforward, garden variety real estate purchase agreement. It 
sets forth the terms of Margetts' purchase of the condominium unit from American Savings. 
It makes no mention of the Twenty Percent Agreement. Nothing in the two agreements 
indicate they should be read as one. 
The Condominium Purchase Agreement contains an integration clause. (See 
Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 7, f 18.) When an integrated written agreement comprehensively lays 
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out the parties' rights and duties, it is presumed to contain the parties' entire rights and 
obligations. Ron Case Roofing, 773 P.2d at 1385. 
Since the meaning of both Agreements is unambiguous, oral evidence is not 
allowed to contradict their terms. Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Ass'n, 656 P.2d 414, 
417 (Utah 1982). Margetts' contention that he was entitled to the unit without any further 
payment on his part contradicts the express terms of the Condominium Purchase Agreement. 
The Condominium Purchase Agreement makes no mention of setoffs or credits against the 
purchase price (except the nonrefundable $150,000 credit expressly provided for). The trial 
court refused to allow the Twenty Percent Agreement to modify or contradict the terms of 
the Condominium Purchase Agreement. This refusal was a proper application of the parol 
evidence rule. 
Even if read together, the Twenty Percent Agreement would not modify the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement because American Savings was not a party to the Twenty 
Percent Agreement. Margetts was only entitled to receive from Terrace Falls twenty percent 
of whatever Terrace Falls received after executing the Deed in Lieu Agreement, which 
turned out to be nothing. 
B. New West is Not Liable as a Successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls, 
Margetts contends that American Savings assumed Terrace Falls' liabilities 
under the Twenty Percent Agreement, because it accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure from 
Terrace Falls. Margetts cannot escape the fact that American Savings was not a party to the 
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Twenty Percent Agreement. Contracts are binding only upon the parties to the contract. 
Drummond v. Johnson, 643 P.2d 634, 639 (Okla. 1982). American Savings was not liable 
under the Twenty Percent Agreement merely because it benefited from the agreement. 
Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977). 
Margetts argues that American Savings is liable under the Twenty Percent 
Agreement as a successor to Terrace Falls. By accepting the deed in lieu of foreclosure 
American Savings did not become Terrace Falls. It merely acquired the Project in 
satisfaction of its loan. See Deed in Lieu Agreement, Plaintiff's Trial Ex. 4. It acquired no 
other assets of Terrace Falls. The liabilities owed by Terrace Falls to Margetts under the 
Twenty Percent Agreement did not run with the land. Margetts' rights under that agreement 
were rights in personalty. Terrace Falls' liabilities under the Twenty Percent Agreement 
were personal debts and remained with Terrace Falls after American Savings took over the 
Project. 
Second, even if American Savings (and thus New West) were Terrace Falls' 
successor, there are no facts to indicate that American Savings assumed any liability under 
the Twenty Percent Agreement. "If a successor does not promise to satisfy its predecessor's 
indebtedness or assume the predecessor's obligations, the predecessor's creditors are not 
entitled to recover against the successor. Clark County v. Bonanza No. i, 615 P.2d 939, 
954 (Nev. 1980). Margetts' assertion that American Savings was obligated to Margetts as a 
third party beneficiary fails for the same reason. American Savings never promised to 
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satisfy Terrace Falls' obligations to Margetts under the Twenty Percent Agreement any other 
obligations.17 Moreover, Margetts did not assert a third-party beneficiary claim in his 
Answer (See Addendum F) or at trial, and is therefore precluded from raising this claim for 
the first time on appeal. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 
App. 1990) cert. den. sub nom.. 
IV. THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT NO FRAUD WAS COMMITTED AGAINST MARGETTS. 
In the earlier opinion, this Court recognized that the trial court's findings on 
agency would probably determine the outcome on the fraud issues. If Snow were not 
American Savings' agent, Margetts cannot possibly prevail on a fraud claim against New 
West based upon Snow's alleged misrepresentations. However, this Court stated that it 
would be helpful for the trial court to enter subsidiary findings on what Snow said, if 
anything, to Margetts regarding American Savings' role under the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. Memorandum Decision, p. 5. The trial court found that Snow did not 
misrepresent to Margetts that he was American Savings' agent, that American Savings 
"would become Terrace Falls" or that American Savings would be bound by the Twenty 
Percent Agreement. (Supp. Findings t t LB. 1-6.) The trial court also found that Margetts 
could not have reasonably relied on alleged statements by Snow in entering into the 
Margetts recites a provision in the Deed in Lieu Agreement where American Savings agrees to front 
Terrace Falls' costs in reaching certain specified settlements. Margetts' settlement was not one of them. Instead, 
Margetts settlement was handled through separate documents. 
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Condominium Purchase Agreement with American Savings or the Twenty Percent Agreement 
with Terrace Falls. {Id.) 
A. Except for Margetts' Uncorroborated Testimony. Which the Trial Court 
Did not Believe, There Was no Evidence Supporting His Fraud Claim. All 
Other Evidence, Including Snow's Testimony, Contradicted Margetts' 
Assertions of Fraud. 
The claim that Snow misrepresented American Savings' role under the Twenty 
Percent Agreement is supported only by Margetts' uncorroborated testimony. Snow 
specifically denied making any such misrepresentations. (Tr. 136-137.) 
The circumstantial evidence supports Snow's testimony. The position Margetts 
claims he was holding out for — a credit of twenty percent of the proceeds from the Project 
up to $134,283, in addition to the $150,000 credit already offered by American Savings — 
would have resulted in Margetts getting the unit for free, a total capitulation by American 
Savings. It is totally implausible that Margetts could have held such an expectation, given 
the fact that American Savings had the power to foreclose Margetts' interest in the Project 
and deny him any recovery whatsoever. 
Margetts must prove fraud and misrepresentation by clear and convincing 
evidence. Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 255 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court found 
that such evidence does not exist, and that finding must be upheld. 
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B. The Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Finding that Margetts Could not 
have Reasonably Relied on Alleged Statements by Snow. 
One of the elements of fraud is actual justifiable reliance on the alleged 
misrepresentation. Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Taylor 
v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980)). The trial court found that Margetts could 
not have reasonably relied upon any misrepresentation by Snow as to the binding effect of 
the Twenty Percent Agreement upon American Savings. 
Although Margetts claimed that Snow tricked him into executing the Twenty 
Percent Agreement, the Release and the Condominium Purchase Agreement, Margetts 
admitted that he had read all of the contracts before he signed them. (Tr. 252 and 256.) He 
was represented by an attorney when he executed the contracts. (Id. at 253.) Margetts 
understood ihe language of the Condominium Purchase Agreement and the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. (Id. at 254 and 256.) Thus, Margetts knew when he signed the contracts that 
American Savings was not a party to the Twenty Percent Agreement. (R. 467-468, Bench 
Decision at 5.) The trial court found that he recognized the inconsistencies between the 
written meaning of the agreements and the alleged statements by Snow. (Supp. Findings 
1I.B.3; Findings, f 1.13.) 
Margetts never requested that Snow's alleged representations be memorialized 
in writing. (R. 467-468, Bench Decision at 5; Findings, 1f 1.13.) He signed all the 
documents as they were presented to him. (Tr. 176.) Thus, Margetts received exactly what 
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the contracts stated he would receive. '"One who gets what he bargains for cannot be said to 
be defrauded.'" State v. Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 120, 8 P.2d 589, 590 (Utah 1932). 
Based on these facts, the trial court's ruling that Margetts did not justifiably 
rely on the alleged misrepresentations is consistent with the evidence and must be affirmed. 
C. Margetts Offers no Basis for Overturning the Trial Court's Finding that 
He Entered into the Agreements Voluntarily, Without Duress. 
Margetts' Answer, Seventh Defense, alleges that American Savings "engaged 
in improper conduct amounting to duress to force defendant to surrender his . . . lien against 
the [Project]." (R. 30; a copy of the Answer is attached hereto as Addendum F.) Margetts 
failed to marshall any evidence at trial to provide this defense. Accordingly, the trial court 
found that he entered into the agreements surrendering his lien in exchange for the right to 
purchase the condominium at a reduced price. (Findings, 11.8.) On appeal, Margetts 
similarly fails to marshal evidence to support his claim of duress. The following is the 
extent of his discussion of the issue in his brief: "[d]uress and coercion are also present" 
(citation omitted). (Brief of Appellant, p. 34.) The Court should summarily affirm on the 
duress claim. 
D. Margetts Either Failed to Plead or Offer Evidence to Support his Other 
Theories of Improper Conduct. 
The remaining theories of "improper conduct" (negligent misrepresentation, 
mistake, etc.) asserted in Margetts' brief are not even pleaded in his Answer. Nor were they 
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asserted at trial. Margetts gave each theory one sentence in his brief. {Id.) This Court 
should give them similar treatment. 
V. BECAUSE MARGETTS WRONGFULLY RETAINED POSSESSION OF THE 
PROPERTY AFTER REPUDIATING HIS PURCHASE AGREEMENT, HE 
FORFEITED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT AND NEW WEST IS 
ENTITLED TO THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS 
WRONGFUL OCCUPANCY. 
A. New West Was Entitled to Recover Fair Rental Value. 
Margetts took possession of the condominium unit in August of 1985. In 
August of 1987, New West made a final demand on Margetts to perform his obligations 
under the Condominium Purchase Agreement. (Tr. 181-183.) Margetts refused and insisted 
he was entitled to credits (based on the Twenty Percent Agreement) which would allow him 
to get the unit for free. (R. 467-468.) The trial court found that Margetts was not entitled 
to those credits; therefore his refusal to pay amounted to a repudiation or breach of the 
purchase agreement. (Findings, f II.5-9; R. 517-18.) Margetts refused to vacate the unit 
until after the trial, on November 30, 1989. {Id. at f 11.19.) During the four-year period of 
his occupancy, he made no payments under the purchase agreement and no payments of rent. 
(Id.) 
The trial court did not award New West the fair rental value during the initial 
two-year period Margetts occupied the unit. (R. 467-468.) The court found that Margetts 
provided certain services and both parties benefited from Margetts' possession during that 
period of time. (Id.) However, the trial court did award fair rental value from the date 
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Margetts finally repudiated his obligation to pay for the condominium until the date he 
vacated the unit. This determination is consistent with Utah law. Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983). See also Marshall v. Bare, 687 P.2d 591, 594 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1984) (a purchaser of land who disaffirms the purchase contract while in possession must pay 
the seller fair rental value of the land); Abrams v. Financial Service Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 
374 P.2d 309, 311 (1962) (seller is entitled to reasonable rent for time a proposed buyer used 
house rent-free). 
It is important to note that New West did not seek other damages for breach of 
contract, such as the difference between the contract price and the current market value of 
the unit. Under the case law cited above, New West was entitled to opt for rental value 
during the period it was denied the use of its property. To permit Margetts to continue using 
the unit rent free after refusing to honor a valid purchase agreement would constitute unjust 
enrichment. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah App. 1988). Alternatively, New 
West would be entitled to recover the rental value under principles of quantum meruit. 
Regardless of the underlying theory, the above case law makes it clear that the disaffirming 
buyer is liable for fair rental value during the period he wrongfully retains possession of the 
property. 
B. The Termination of Margetts' Rights Under the Purchase Agreement Was 
Not Unjust or Unconscionable. 
Margetts argues that his forfeiture of the nonrefundable $150,000.00 credit 
under the purchase agreement was unconscionable. It is important to remember that this 
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credit did not represent funds actually paid to American Savings. Rather, it simply 
represented a concession on the purchase price of the unit in consideration of the release of 
Margetts' junior lien on the project which allowed New West and Terrace Falls to avoid the 
complications of a formal foreclosure to eliminate his lien. For that reason, the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement specifically provided that the credit was "nonrefundable". 
The cases Margetts relies upon involve contract buyers who default after 
making substantial payments toward the purchase of the property. None of the cases 
Margetts cites involves a credit like the one Margetts held. Rather, in each of these cases, 
the seller's damages for the buyer's default are merely offset in the amount of money the 
buyer had paid to the seller under the contract before the buyer defaulted. Sojfe v. Ridd, 659 
P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983) (court refuses to enforce forfeiture provision of contract, requiring 
seller to return amount buyer paid under the contract, less fair rental value and other 
miscellaneous damages); Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991) (seller required to 
return to buyer amount buyer had paid under contract in excess of seller's actual damages); 
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986) (same); Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 
1981) (same); Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977) (same); Jacobsen v. Swan, 
278 P.2d 294 (Utah 1954) (same). In these cases, the law properly provides that the buyer's 
substantial equity in the property may not be summarily forfeited. These cases have no 
application here, however, because Margetts made no payments to American Savings under 
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the contract.- Margetts simply lost a discount on the price of a condominium because he 
decided not to buy the condominium. 
Simply put, the facts surrounding the $150,000 credit amount to this: 
Margetts had a nonrefundable credit toward the purchase of a condominium. He decided not 
to purchase the condominium. He now wants a cash refund of that nonrefundable credit. 
The trial court found he was not entitled to such a refund under the terms of the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement. 
In reality, Margetts' credit was not forfeited, he simply repudiated it by 
refusing to perform the contract. The trial court recognized that fact and saw no reason to 
deduct the $150,000.00 from the rent to which New West was entitled for the period 
Margetts wrongfully refused to relinquish possession of the unit. Accordingly, Margetts 
suffered no unconscionable or unjust forfeiture. 
C. The Evidence of Fair Rental Value Supported the Award to New West. 
New West provided expert testimony on the fair rental value of the 
condominium unit. The witness was a real estate broker who had twelve years of real estate 
experience. (Tr. 149.) He was the property manager for Terrace Falls Condominiums. 
(Tr. 150.) He had experience managing other, similar projects. (Tr. 150, 151.) Based on 
his experience, this witness testified that during the period Margetts occupied the unit, the 
fair rental value was between $900.00 and $1,000.00 per month. (Tr. 158.) The trial court 
-
;
 The court did find that Margetts had made certain improvements in the unit, the value of which was 
deducted from the rent awarded to New West. (Findings, f 11.19.) 
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awarded rent of $900 per month rent beginning after the date of repudiation, September 1, 
1987, until Margetts vacated. (Findings ff 1.26; 11.10.) Margetts never challenged this 
witness' credibility or rebutted the testimony with his own evidence. Because he failed to 
put on any evidence of fair rental value of Unit 413, the trial court had no choice but to 
accept the evidence proffered by New West and award $900.00 per month for rent. 
VI. THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE UPHELD. 
A. Margetts Failed To Raise Objections In The Trial Court To the 
Applicability of the Unlawful Detainer Statute or to Any Failure By New 
West To Comply With its Procedural Requirements. 
It is unnecessary for this Court to review the judgment for unlawful detainer. 
Prior to this appeal, Margetts never raised the issue of whether New West was making an 
appropriate claim under the unlawful detainer statute or whether it complied with the statute's 
procedural requirements. Such objections were not raised in Margetts' Answer (R. 27-51), 
his Pre-Trial Brief (R. 415-430) or at trial. They were raised for the first time on appeal. 
An issue not raised to the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1359; Ringwood v. Hernandez, 795 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1990); Broberg 
v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201-202 (Utah App. 1989). Therefore, this Court should summarily 
affirm the award for unlawful detainer. 
s \wcb\18812 
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B. Margetts is Liable for Unlawful Detainer Because He Wrongfully Retained 
Possession of the Property After Repudiating the Purchase Agreement. 
Utah's unlawful detainer statute states in pertinent part: 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is 
guilty of unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after 
the expiration of the specified term or period for which it 
is let to him, which specified term or period, whether 
established by express or implied contract, or whether 
written or parol, shall be terminated without notice at the 
expiration of the specified term or period . . . or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by 
subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or 
covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is held, 
other than those previously mentioned, and after notice in writing 
requiring in the alternative the performance of the conditions or 
covenant or the surrender of the property . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(l)(a), (e). 
Margetts continued to possess the unit after wrongfully refusing New West's 
demand that he perform under the Condominium Purchase Agreement or vacate the unit. 
Upon his repudiation of the contract and refusal to vacate, the implied agreement by which 
he possessed the unit ended. Thereafter, Margetts' possession was an unlawful detainer 
under subsections (a) and (e) of the statute. 
C. New West Complied With the Unlawful Detainer Statute. 
New West's Complaint alleged that it served Margetts with a Notice to Quit by 
certified mail as required by § 78-36-6. (R. 7, f 20.) In his Answer, Margetts admitted to 
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receiving the Notice to Quit. (R. 27-51, 1 11.) Margetts did not in his Answer or at trial 
assert that the Notice to Quit was improperly mailed. Accordingly, New West did not offer 
evidence to that effect. Based on the authority cited above, Margetts cannot raise this issue 
for the first time on appeal. 
Margetts asserts that the award for unlawful detainer should be overturned 
because his wife was not served with the Notice to Quit. Again, this defense was not raised 
in this Answer, his Pre-trial brief or at trial. The unlawful detainer statute does not require 
that all occupants be personally handed a copy of the Notice to Quit. New West's Notice to 
Quit was properly addressed to "the occupants of the premises located at Unit 413." (R. 22, 
Ex. D.) 
Margetts failed to comply with the Notice to Quit. The trial court correctly 
determined that he was liable for unlawful detainer. That judgment should be affirmed. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES TO NEW 
WEST. 
A. At Trial Both Parties Agreed that the Prevailing Party Would be Entitled 
to Attorneys' Fees and Margetts Did Not Object to the Amount of New 
West's Fees. 
This Court need not review the award of attorneys' fees to New West. 
Margetts never questioned whether an award of attorneys' fees was proper. Indeed, in the 
following exchange during the trial, Margetts' counsel requested a special hearing for the 
prevailing party to present attorneys' fees: 
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MR. FAIRCLOUGH: With the Court's permission, and I have 
no objection that we wait until you make your decision. The prevailing 
party would then have an opportunity to present attorney's fees and 
discuss the matter at a separate hearing. I have no objection to that. 
THE COURT: Is that agreeable? 
MR. BATTLE: Yes, that is agreeable. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
(Tr. 279.) 
After the trial concluded, New West submitted an Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs. The Affidavit requested attorneys' fees of $20,515. Margetts filed an Objection 
contesting certain cost items, but he did not challenge the amount of New West's attorneys' 
fees. (R. 485-486.) Thereafter, the court awarded New West attorneys' fees in the amount 
requested. (R. 519-522.) As noted above, an objection or issue not raised to the trial court 
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. Ringwood, 786 P.2d 1359; Broberg, 782 
P.2d at 201-202. The Court should summarily affirm the award of attorneys' fees. 
B. The Condominium Purchase Agreement Provides for an Award of 
Attorneys9 Fees. 
Margetts admits that the Condominium Purchase Agreement provides for 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if a dispute arises under the agreement. Appellant's 
Brief at 45. He argues, however, that this case does not involve a dispute under the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement. 
s.\wcb\18812 
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Obviously, New West's lawsuit resulted directly from Margetts' refusal to 
perform the Condominium Purchase Agreement. The trial court ruled that Margetts 
breached the Condominium Purchase Agreement. (Findings, if II.8.) The fact that New 
West sought to recover fair rental value did not mean that it abandoned its rights under the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement, as Margetts now argues. To the contrary, his refusal to 
perform that Agreement, coupled with his refusal to vacate was the basis for the award to 
New West. It was also the basis for the award of attorneys' fees. 
Moreover, Margetts was attempting to enforce his interpretation of the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement, modified by the Twenty Percent Agreement. He 
contended that those agreements, read together, required New West to deliver him the unit 
free of charge. New West is entitled to attorneys' fees for defeating that claim under the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement. 
When a contract's terms provide for an award of attorneys' fees, the fees are 
"to be awarded as a matter of legal right." Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 
App. 1989). Accordingly, this Court must affirm the award of attorneys' fees to New West. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
TO NEW WEST. 
The trial court determined that the rental value of the unit was susceptible of 
mathematical computation. The trial court observed, 
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as to the prejudgment interest, we are talking about rentals. And once 
a rental value is determined . . . it is susceptible of mathematical 
computation. And I think that's quite different from the personal injury 
case where pain and suffering is not ascertainable. Once having found 
what the reasonable rental value is, then it is a mathematical 
computation. 
(Bench Decision, dated September 28, 1992, R. 930.) The trial court's decision to award 
prejudgment interest to New West is not inconsistent with this Court's decisions in Shoreline 
Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992) and Price-Orem v. 
Rawlins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989). Those cases followed the 
guidelines set by the Utah Supreme Court in Bjork v. April Industries Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 
317 (Utah 1977) cert. den. 431 U.S. 930 (1977): "Where the damage is complete and the 
amount of loss fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and 
figures, interest should be allowed from that time and not from the date of the judgment." 
Under the Supreme Court's test, New West is entitled to prejudgment interest 
because the rental value is a fixed amount ($900 per month) and can be assessed from a fixed 
date (September 1, 1987, the date Margetts repudiated the contract and refused to vacate). It 
is a simple mathematical computation of damages for breach of the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement. The Shoreline and Price-Orem cases are distinguishable because one involved an 
equitable claim for unjust enrichment and the other involved a claim for lost profits. In 
neither case could damages be determined with mathematical precision and this Court 
properly disallowed prejudgment interest. Damages in the present case, however, were 
s:\wcb\18812 
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calculated with absolute mathematical precision as indicated in the trial court's Findings at 
f 11.19. Accordingly, that award of prejudgment interest must be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
New West respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial 
court in all respects. Furthermore, New West requests an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
on appeal, pursuant to the contract provisions referred to in Section VII, above. 
DATED this 22nd day of October, 1993. 
W. Cullen Battle 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of October, 1993, I caused to be hand-
delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, successor-
in-interest to American Savings 
and Loan Association, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN L. MARGETTS, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
Civil No. 890901645CN 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
On February 20, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
a Memorandum Decision reversing the final judgment entered by 
this Court on April 23, 1990. The Court of Appeals remanded the 
case, requesting this Court to enter additional findings of fact 
and conclusions of law on the issues of agency and fraud. The 
Court of Appeals also requested this Court to clarify why it 
awarded New West Federal Savings and Loan Association ("New 
West") remedies that included a combination of forfeiture and 
rent. Pursuant to these instructions, the Court enters the 
following Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
These findings and conclusions are entered in addition to and not 
in replacement of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered April 23, 1990. 
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I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Agency 
This Court finds that Gerald Snow, in his dealings with 
defendant Margetts regarding Terrace Falls, never acted as an 
agent or attorney for American Savings and Loan Association 
("American Savings"), and that Mr, Snow was never vested with 
actual or apparent authority to enter into agreements with 
defendant Margetts in behalf of American Savings. In support of 
these findings, the Court enters the following subsidiary 
findings: 
1. In 1981, Mr. Snow began serving as counsel for 
Terrace Falls Condominiums Partnership ("Terrace Falls"), which 
owned the Terrace Falls Condominiums project (the "Project"). 
(Tr. 25.) 
2. In December, 1981, Mr. Snow represented Terrace 
Falls in obtaining a construction loan for the Project from 
American Savings and Loan Association ("American Savings"), the 
predecessor to New West. (Tr. 26-31.) 
3. In December of 1981, as part of his efforts to help 
Terrace Falls obtain the construction loan, Mr. Snow met and 
negotiated with defendant Margetts and his attorney, Ralph Marsh, 
concerning the subordination of a lien Margetts held against the 
Project. On that occasion, Mr. Snow advised both defendant 
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Margetts and Mr. Marsh that he was representing Terrace Falls. 
(Tr. 31-32; 109-111.) 
4. Mr. Snow, as attorney for Terrace Falls, drafted 
the original condominium purchase agreement between defendant 
Margetts and Terrace Falls in 1981. (Tr. 33-34.) 
5. When Terrace Falls defaulted on the construction 
loan in 1984, Mr. Snow, in his capacity as attorney for Terrace 
Falls, began negotiating a loan workout with American Savings. 
American Savings retained Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell locally, 
and Roulac Garn of the law firm of Barlow, Welch, Terrant & 
Miller in California, to represent it as counsel in these 
negotiations. (Tr. 39-40; 59; 283.) 
6. In September of 1984, American Savings agreed to 
accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure from Terrace Falls provided 
that Terrace Falls could deliver free and clear title to the 
Project. To clear title, Mr. Snow, in his capacity as counsel 
for Terrace Falls, thereafter began negotiating to obtain 
releases from Terrace Falls1 creditors who held liens on the 
Project. Defendant Margetts was one of the lien creditors 
contacted by Mr. Snow. (Tr. 39; 53; 56-59.) 
7. Mr. Snow first contacted Margetts regarding the 
1984 negotiations through a letter to Mr. Marsh dated 
September 7, 1984. (Tr. 56; Ex. 5.) That letter explained that 
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Terrace Palls was attempting to negotiate a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure with American Savings and that such an arrangement 
would require "an acceptable settlement with all the junior 
lienholders." (Ld.) 
8. The September 7, 1984 letter identified Kirton, 
McConkie and Bushnell as local counsel for American Savings. 
(Ld.) Nothing in the letter suggests that Mr. Snow was 
representing American Savings or anyone other than Terrace Falls, 
(id.) 
9. The September 7, 1984 letter requested defendant 
Margetts to attend a meeting with American Savings at the offices 
of Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, its local counsel, the 
following week. (id.) Defendant Margetts and his attorney, Mr. 
Marsh, both attended the meeting. (Tr. 60; 244; 264.) Mr. Perry 
from Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell represented American Savings, 
and Mr. Snow attended on behalf of Terrace Falls, (id.) A Mr. 
Lee Stephens from American Savings also attended the meeting, 
(id.) Defendant Margetts mistakenly believed that Mr. Stephens 
was an attorney. (Tr. 244.) 
10. During the ensuing negotiations, which culminated 
in November, 1984, Mr. Snow never told defendant Margetts or Mr. 
Marsh that he was representing American Savings. (Tr. 79-80; 
109-111.) Defendant Margetts and Mr. Marsh both admit this fact. 
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(Tr. 248; 266.) Defendant Margetts also admits that he never 
inquired as to whom Mr. Snov vas representing. (Id.) 
11. During this entire periodf defendant Margetts' 
only contact vith American Savings vas the initial September 
meeting at Kirtonf McConkie and Bushnell. (Tr. 244-47.) No one 
at that meeting, including Mr. Perry and Mr. Stephens, told 
Margetts that Mr. Snov vas representing American Savings. (Tr. 
248.) 
12. Throughout the fall of 1984, Mr. Snov negotiated 
settlements and releases vith Terrace Falls1 lien creditors. 
(Tr. 53.) Mr. Snov also drafted the settlement agreements and 
obtained signatures on the settlement documents from Terrace 
Falls' lien creditors. (id.) Throughout these negotiations, Mr. 
Snov represented only Terrace Falls. (Tr. 55.) The Court finds 
that Snov, in engaging in these activities, vas serving the 
interests of Terrace Falls, vhich directly benefited from the 
transaction by avoiding the adverse consequences of a 
foreclosure. Mr. Snov never intended to represent American 
Savings, nor did he believe that he vas representing American 
Savings in these negotiations. (Tr. 80.) 
13. During his negotiations vith defendant Margetts, 
Mr. Snov assumed that defendant Margetts knev that he continued 
to represent Terrace Falls, not American Savings. (Tr. 110.) 
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14. Throughout the time he was negotiating lien 
creditor settlements for Terrace Falls, Mr. Snow sent to American 
Savings or its attorneys, for their review and approval, drafts 
of all settlement documents that he believed would create a legal 
obligation on the part of American Savings. (Tr. 82.) 
15. Mr. Snow never presented to American Savings or 
its attorneys for final review and approval, the Agreement, dated 
November 14, 1984, executed by defendant Margetts and Terrace 
Falls (the "Twenty Percent Agreement"). Mr. Snow did not intend 
that agreement to create a legal duty on the part of American 
Savings. (Tr. 71; 140.) 
16. Neither American Savings nor its attorneys saw the 
Twenty Percent Agreement before it was executed by defendant 
Margetts and Terrace Falls. (Tr. 71; 286.) 
17. American Savings never gave Mr. Snow permission to 
enter into any agreements on behalf of American Savings. (Tr. 
285-286). 
18. Because Terrace Falls lacked funds to pay Mr. 
Snow's attorney's fees for his work on behalf of Terrace Falls to 
complete the construction loan workout, American Savings agreed 
to pay Mr. Snow's attorney's fees as it paid other Terrace Falls 
creditors. (Tr. 50 and 51.) Mr. Margetts was not aware that 
American Savings had agreed to pay Mr. Snow's attorney's fees at 
-6-
nnp>5fi 
the time he entered into the Condominium Purchase Agreementf the 
Settlement Agreement and the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
19. American Savings never ratified the Twenty Percent 
Agreement, nor did American Savings or New West agree to accept 
Terrace Falls' liabilities under the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
B. Fraud 
This Court finds that defendant Margetts failed to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that American Savings, 
its agents or its attorneys made a material misrepresentation in 
connection with the negotiation and execution of the Condominium 
Purchase Agreement, the Settlement Agreement, the Twenty Percent 
Agreement or any other documents by which defendant Margetts 
released his lien on the Project and agreed to purchase a 
condominium from American Savings after the Project was 
completed. In support of this finding, and in addition to the 
subsidiary findings regarding agency set forth above, the Court 
enters the following subsidiary findings: 
1. Mr. Snow never stated to defendant Margetts or his 
attorney that Mr. Snow represented American Savings. (Tr. 79 and 
80.) 
2. The Court finds that Mr. Snow did not state to 
defendant Margetts that American Savings would become Terrace 
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Falls or would otherwise succeed to Terrace Falls' legal duties 
under the Twenty Percent Agreement. (Tr. 136 and 137.) 
3. Other than defendant Margetts' testimony, which 
the Court chose not to accept, the Court heard no evidence that 
Mr. Snow represented that the Twenty Percent Agreement would be 
binding upon American Savings. The remaining evidence, including 
Margetts' long history of dealings with Terrace Falls, and the 
written document which on its face was inconsistent with the 
alleged misrepresentations, leads the Court to conclude that 
Margetts was not mislead as to the meaning or effect of the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. 
4. American Savings' representatives were not 
involved in the negotiation or execution of the Twenty Percent 
Agreement, and never represented to defendant Margetts that 
American Savings would be bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
(Tr. 71 and 140.) 
5. Based upon the subsidiary findings regarding 
agency, above, and the Court's earlier findings of April 23, 
1990, and particularly the written document which on its face was 
an agreement between Margetts and Terrace Falls only, this Court 
finds that it would have been unreasonable for defendant Margetts 
to have relied upon any representation by Mr. Snow as to the 
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binding effect of the Twenty Percent Agreement upon American 
Savings. 
6. Based on the foregoingf the Court further finds 
that there is not clear and convincing evidence to show that Mr. 
Snow misrepresented the binding effect of the Twenty Percent 
Agreement on American Savings, or that defendant Margetts 
reasonably relied upon any such misrepresentations. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Agency 
1. The evidence established that Mr. Snow did not act 
on behalf of American Savings and that American Savings did not 
control Mr. Snow in his negotiations with defendant Margetts. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that a principal-agent 
relationship did not exist between Mr. Snow and American Savings. 
2. The acts of an agent are not binding on the 
principal unless the agent is acting pursuant to either actual or 
apparent authority, or the principal ratifies the acts of the 
agent. Municipal Building Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 279 
(Utah 1985). The Court concludes that Mr. Snow did not have 
actual authority to bind American Savings in his negotiations 
with Margetts. 
3. The apparent authority of an agent can be inferred 
only from the conduct of the principal. City Elec. v. Dean Evans 
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Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983); Walker Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983). The Court 
concludes that American Savings and its representatives did not 
make statements or engage in conduct from which defendant 
Margetts could reasonably infer that Mr. Snow had authority to 
bind American Savings. 
4. A person dealing exclusively with an agent has a 
duty to ascertain the agent's authority despite any 
representations of the agent. City Elec.. 672 P.2d at 90. The 
Court concludes that defendant Margetts failed to satisfy that 
duty regarding his assertion that Mr. Snow was representing 
American Savings in negotiating the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
5. Mr. Snow did not have actual or apparent authority 
to bind American Savings to the Twenty Percent Agreement, and 
American Savings did not ratify actions or statements by Mr. Snow 
regarding that agreement. Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, 
Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977) (a party does not 
assume another party's contractual liabilities merely because it 
benefits from the agreement); County of Clark v. Bonanza No. 1, 
615 P.2d 939, 943 (Nev. 1980). 
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B. Fraud 
1. In order to prove fraud, a person must show, by 
clear and convincing evidence, a material misrepresentation of 
fact made knowingly or recklessly with the intent to induce 
reliance, actual and justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation, and damages resulting from the reliance. 
Taylor v. Gasor, Inc.. 607 P.2d 293, 294 and 95 (Utah 1980). 
2. Defendant Margetts failed to establish, by clear 
and convincing evidence that American Savings, its agents or its 
attorneys fraudulently induced him to enter into the Settlement 
Agreement, the Condominium Purchase Agreement or the Twenty 
Percent Agreement. 
C. Remedies 
1. Defendant Margetts repudiated the Condominium 
Purchase Agreement in August of 1987 when he refused New West's 
final demand to close on Unit 413. By repudiating the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement, defendant Margetts forfeited his 
right under the Condominium Purchase Agreement to receive a 
non-refundable $150,000 credit towards the purchase of a Terrace 
Falls Condominium. 
2. A seller of real estate is entitled to receive 
reasonable rent from a disaffirming buyer for the period of time 
the buyer possessed the real estate rent-free. Abrams v. 
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Financial Serv. Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 374 P.2d 309, 311 (1962); 
Marshall v. Bare. 687 P.2d 591, 594 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). 
3. Because the fair rental value of Unit 413 was 
§900.00 per month during the period of defendant Margetts1 
occupancy. New West is entitled to receive $900.00 per month rent 
from the date defendant Margetts repudiated the Condominium 
Purchase Agreement to the date defendant Margetts vacated Unit 
413. 
4. Defendant Margetts is entitled to an offset 
against rent for the amount of his improvements to Unit 413, as 
set forth in the Court's earlier findings, dated April 23, 1990. 
However, Margetts is not entitled to further offset regarding the 
$150,000 credit because that amount was not paid to or received 
by American Savings, but was merely reflected as a credit against 
the purchase price under the Condominium Purchase Agreement. 
DATED this lb -tlay of 0 efofcls 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Kennfeth Rigtfup^ 
District Court Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of September, 
1992, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand-
delivered to: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101 
CTJ:0624 92A 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND ) 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, successor-in- ) 
interest to AMERICAN SAVINGS AND ) 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California ) 
corporation, ) 
V • 
JOHN 
Plainti 
L. MARGETTS, 
ff, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Civil No. 890901645CN 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
The court hereby enters the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in connection with the trial that was held 
on November 14, 15 and 16, 1989. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 14, 1984, Plaintiff's predecessor, 
American Savings and Loan Association ("American Savings"), and 
defendant John L. Margetts ("Margetts") entered into a Condomin-
ium Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") (Exhibit 7) whereby 
Margetts agreed to purchase from American Savings Unit 413 of the 
Terrace Falls Condominium Project (the "Project"). 
2. The purchase price for Unit 413 under the Purchase 
Agreement was $134,283, which reflected a non-refundable $150,000 
credit that was granted to Margetts against the original list 
price of Unit 413. 
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3. On November 14, 1984, Margetts and American Savings 
also entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement Agree-
ment") (Exhibit 6) in which Margetts, in consideration of the 
Purchase Agreement and $150,000 credit granted toward his pur-
chase of Unit 413, gave up all other claims he may have had 
against American Savings, or liens he may have had against the 
Project. 
4. Prior to American Savings' acquisition of the 
Project, it held a first lien against the Project, and Margetts 
held a lien that was subordinate to American Savings' lien. 
5. In furtherance of the Settlement Agreement, 
Margetts on November 14, 1984, executed a General Release 
(Exhibit 8) and a Request for Reconveyance (Exhibit 9) pursuant 
to which he released all claims against American Savings or the 
Project except his rights under the Purchase Agreement. 
6. The Purchase Agreement is unambiguous and it repre-
sents the entire agreement between Margetts and American Savings 
concerning the purchase of Unit 413. 
7. The Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and it rep-
resents the entire agreement between Margetts, American Savings, 
Terrace Falls Condominiums, a Utah partnership ("Terrace Falls") 
and its principals concerning the release of Margetts' lien 
claims against the Project. 
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8. Margetts entered into the Settlement Agreement and 
the Purchase Agreement voluntarily, without duress. 
9. The Agreement, dated November 14, 1984 between 
Margetts and Terrace Falls, which has been referred to by the 
parties as the "20% Agreement" (Exhibit 10), was executed by 
Margetts and Terrace Falls only. 
10. American Savings did not agree to perform any 
obligations under the 20% Agreement. 
11. American Savings did not otherwise agree to assume 
any obligations of Terrace Falls or its principals to Margetts. 
12. No fraud was committed by American Savings, or its 
agents or attorneys, in connection with the negotiation and exe-
cution of the Purchase Agreement, the Settlement Agreement, the 
20% Agreement or the other documents referred to above. 
13. Even if Gerald Snow, who was Terrace Falls1 attor-
ney, had made material misrepresentations of fact to Margetts in 
connection with the execution of those documents, any reliance by 
Margetts upon those misrepresentations would have been unreason-
able because: 
(a) Margetts recognized that the 20% Agreement 
was inconsistent with Snow's alleged representations; 
(b) Margetts was represented by an attorney in 
the transaction, but he did not consult with that attorney 
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regarding the apparent inconsistency between the agreement 
and the alleged representations; 
(c) Margetts did not request that the alleged 
representations be memorialized in writing; and 
(d) Margetts never inquired about Mr. Snow's 
authority to bind American Savings. 
14. Mr. Snow did not have actual or apparent authority 
to enter into agreements in behalf of American Savings, or to 
modify existing agreements. 
15. Margetts took occupancy of Unit 413 in August 
1985, before closing or paying any of the purchase price. 
16. When Margetts moved into Unit 413, no agreement 
existed between Margetts and American Savings concerning the 
terms of his occupancy of the Unit. However, both parties 
derived benefit from Margetts' occupancy of the Unit. 
17. Unit 413 was not completely finished when Margetts 
took possession. Margetts personally expended $9,234 to substan-
tially complete the Unit. 
18. After Margetts took possession of Unit 413, Ameri-
can Savings discontinued using security personnel for the 
Project. 
19. American Savings encouraged Margetts to find buy-
ers for other units in the Project and to promote the Project. 
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20. No agreement existed between American Savings and 
Margetts concerning compensation of Margetts for security ser-
vices or for finding buyers for the Project. 
21. By a letter dated March llf 1986, American Savings 
notified Margetts that it intended to close the sale of Unit 413 
on March 19, 1986. (Exhibit 26). 
22. In late August, 1987 American Savings made final 
demand on Margetts to consummate the purchase of Unit 413 in 
accordance with the Purchase Agreement for the purchase price of 
$134,283. 
23. On September 2, 1987, Margetts rejected American 
Savings' request for closing and payment of the purchase price. 
24. Thereafter, Margetts continued to refuse to pay 
the purchase price or to return the Unit to American Savings. 
25. By no later than March 25, 1989, American Savings 
had served Margetts with a 5-day Notice to Quit pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S78-36-3. (Exhibit 13). 
26. The fair rental value of Unit 413 during the 
period of Margetts' occupancy is $900 per month. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. By accepting a deed-in lieu of foreclosure to the 
Project, American Savings did not assume any contract obligations 
of Terrace Falls to Margetts. 
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2. The Purchase Agreement and the Settlement Agreement 
are clear and unambiguous and they represent entire agreements 
between the parties on the subjects they purport to cover. 
3. The 20% Agreement is an agreement between Terrace 
Falls and Margetts only. It is not performable by American 
Savings. 
4. Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to alter or 
amend the terms of the Purchase Agreement or the Settlement 
Agreement. 
5. The Purchase Agreement unconditionally required 
Margetts to pay American Savings $134,283 for the purchase of 
Unit 413 within 15 days after receiving a request to close by 
American Savings. 
6. American Savings substantially performed its obli-
gations under the Purchase Agreement and Margetts was not for any 
reasons excused from performing his obligation to purchase the 
Unit for $134,283. 
7. American Savings had made a final demand upon 
Margetts to complete the purchase, and American Savings was enti-
tled to receive the $134,283 purchase price, by no later than 
September 1, 1987. 
8. By retaining possession of Unit 413 and refusing to 
honor American Savings' demands to complete the purchase and pay 
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the purchase price, Margetts was in breach of the Purchase Agree-
ment from September 1, 1987. 
9. Margetts1 breach of the Purchase Agreement and 
refusal to pay the purchase price constitute a repudiation of the 
Purchase Agreement. 
10. As a consequence of such breach and repudiation, 
New West Federal Savings and Loan Association ("New West"), as 
successor to American Savings, is entitled to be restored to pos-
session of Unit 413 and to recover from Margetts the fair rental 
value of the Unit from the time of breach until New West is 
restored to possession. 
11. Margetts has no further right, title or interest 
in the Unit. 
12. In addition, New West is entitled to recover tre-
ble the fair rental value of the Unit from April 1, 1989, pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. S78-36-10. 
13. New West is entitled to recover interest at the 
legal rate on rent due from September 1, 1987 to March 31, 1989. 
However, American Savings is not entitled to interest on the 
taxes and homeowners dues, or on the rent after it is trebled. 
14. Margetts is entitled to offset the foregoing 
amounts with the $9,234 he expended to substantially complete the 
Unit. 
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15. New West is entitled to recover reasonable attor-
neys fees incurred in connection with this action. 
16. New West is entitled to recover costs taxable 
under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and to 
recover post-judgment interest as provided by law. 
17. The attorneys fees and taxable costs submitted by 
New West are reasonable in the amounts which are reflected below. 
18. Because both parties mutually benefitted from 
Margetts1 occupancy of the Unit from August 1985 until September 
1, 1987, when Margetts repudiated the Purchase Agreement, New 
West is not entitled to rent for that period. However, Margetts 
is entitled to no further compensation for security services or 
for finding buyers for the Project. 
19. Pursuant to the foregoing, New West is entitled to 
be possession of Unit 413 from December 1, 1989, and to recover 
judgment against Margetts in the following amounts: 
A. The fair rental value of the 
Unit from September 1, 1987 through 
March 31, 1989 at $900 per month $17,100 
B. Prejudgment interest at 10% through 
November 30, 1989 on rent due 
from September 1, 1987 through 
March 31, 1989 2,565 
C. Treble hold-over rent from 
April 1, 1989 through November 30, 
1989 at $2,700 per month 21,600 
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D. Less the offset for work performed 
by Margetts at his own expense to 
complete the Unit ($ 9,234) 
SUBTOTAL $32,031 
E. Taxable Costs 105 
F. Attorney's Fees 20,515 
. TOTAL $52f651 
DATED this 23~"~day of April, 1990. 
BY THE (ZOURT: 
Kenneth Rigtrup// ZF 
Distrtct Court Judge 
Approved As To Form: 
Arthur H. Nifelsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
o .,-
W. Cullen Battle 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-9-
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TCLCCOPtCR NO (BOO 93B-7843 
September 1, 1984 
Ralph J. Marsh 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
68 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101^ 
Re: Terrace Falls Condominiums 
Dear Ralph: 
As I mentioned to you on the telephone last week, after 
many reviews, discussions, onsite inspections, etc., over the 
past several months, American Savings & Loan has decided to take 
over the Terrace Falls project, either by a foreclosure or a 
deed in lieu. Of course, American wonft accept a deed in lieu 
without arriving at some kind of an acceptable settlement with 
all of the junior lienholders. 
In accordance with its expressed intent to take over the 
project but to try to work out terms of a settlement with the junior 
lienholders (so many cents on the dollar of invested principal), 
Lee Stephens of American Savings is making a special trip to Salt 
Lake City next Wednesday. He has asked me to communicate with 
all of the junior lienholders to invite them to a one-on-one 
meeting with him next Wednesday between the hours of 10:00 a.m. 
and 5:00 p.m. at the offices of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 
American's local counsel. You are certainly welcome to come with 
Jack if you and he can work out a time. As you will appreciate, 
if American isn't able to work out settlements which in the aggregate 
are within its budgeted settlement amount, it will simply take the 
longer but less expensive route of foreclosure. 
Ralph J, Marsh 
September 7, 1984 
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Wells Stevens, Hal Beecher and Ron Stacey have invested 
the last several years of their lives in the Terrace Falls 
Project, and all have acted in good faith in the attempt to make 
this project a success. No one is more deeply disappointed in 
this outcome than they are, and they are anxious to see the other 
creditors in the project get some money back rather than nothing. 
The lender is willing to work with the other creditors partly as 
a gesture of good faith because it feels that Wells and the others 
have treated it honestly and fairly, not inflated costs, not 
skimmed off profits somewhere, and not otherwise acted in an 
uncooperative or hostile manner. Its representatives have told 
us this. But its good faith has what I suppose you would consider 
rather modest dollar and time limits attached. 
Please let me know as soon as possible if you and your 
client can attend a meeting next Wednesday and what time would 
be best. The meeting shouldn*t last more than 45 minutes to an 
hour. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
emerald T. Snow 
GTS/lpk 
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CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT REAL
 tj,^ , 
DEPARUMI 
THIS AGREEMENT .is.made and entered into this . / day 
of November, 1984, .by and between AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN' 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation ("Seller"), and JOHN L. MARGETTS, 
an individual ("Buyer"). 
RECITALS: 
A. Seller is the owner of the Terrace Falls Condominiums 
Project located between 3rd and 4th Avenues west of "A" Street in 
Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Project"). 
B. Buyer desires to acquire from Seller and Seller is 
willing to sell to Buyer a condominium unit in the Project on the 
terms and conditions herein set forth. 
C. This Agreement is entered into pursuant to the terms 
of that certain Settlement Agreement between the parties et al., 
dated OcteSeg^ ''. 1984. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
1. The Unit. Seller does hereby agree to convey to 
Buyer and Buyer does hereby agree to purchase from Seller Unit 
No. 413 in the Project (the "Unit"), as the same is shown and 
described in the Declaration of Condominium and Survey Map'of the 
Project to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office, a copy of which is attached hereto. The foregoing 
description shall be construed to describe the Unit, together with 
the appurtenant undivided interest in the common areas and 
facilities of the Project (including one (1) parking space and one 
(1) storage locker), and also to incorporate all the rights 
incident to and limitations on ownership of a condominium unit in 
the Proj3ct*-*s set forth in said Declaration of Condominium. The 
choice of the foregoing Unit by Buyer shall constitute a final and 
irrevocable selection of a condominium unit in the Project as 
specified in Paragraph 2 of said Settlement Agreement. 
2. Title. Seller shall convey good and marketable title 
to the Unit to Buyer, subject only to the Standard Exceptions and 
Special Exceptions Nos. 2, 3 and 4 set forth in that certain title 
insurance commitment issued by Safeco Title Insurance Company 
through Utah Title and Abstract Company, dated October 11, 1984, a 
copy of which is attached hereto, as well as to the lien for 
current year taxes' not- yet due and the Declaration of Condominium 
and Survey Map of the Project yet to be filed. 
3. Purchase Price. The purchase price of the Unit is 
Two Hundred Ninety-Three Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars 
($293,075.00), less three percent (3.0%) thereof for the absence 
of a sales commission, for a net price of Two Hundred Eighty-Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars (-$284,283.00). In 
accordance with the Settlement Agreement mentioned in Recital C 
above> -Buyer is hereby granted a nonrefundable cr^dif-in the 
amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) towards 
the purchase price. The balance of the purchase price in the 
amount of One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred 
Eighty-Three Dollars ($134,283.00) shall be due in full at the 
closing as set forth hereinafter. 
4.—Condition of UFI4-<H—Buy or hac inspected the^ JJait, 
whieh has been finished to the shell atage with walla aheetrockeo 
and tapodj and io willing to aeeept the construction o£ the Un^t 
to the extent performed te date* * 
5. Finish Allowance, The amount ofLt^y^inislT allowance 
with respect to the Unit which is to be spent^lnc/accordance with 
Buyer's specifications is Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred 
Thirty-Nine Dollars ($16,839.00). The finish allowance has been 
allotted based on a standard finish package. Buyer may require 
Seller to make reasonable modifications and upgrades to the 
standard finish package, but all such modifications and upgrades 
shall be performed entirely at Buyer's expense to the extent the 
aggregate finish allowance is exceeded. 
6. Possession. Possession of the Unit shall pass to 
Buyer as of the closing date. Seller shall have substantially 
completed the Unit to Buyer*s finish specifications prior to the 
closing, provided that Seller shall have a reasonable time after 
the receipt of such specifications or any final change thereto (no 
less than sixty (60) days) in which to complete the Unit. Buyer 
shall provide Seller with Buyer's finish specifications as soon as 
possible, but not later than* March 31, 1985, so that closing can 
take place not later than June 30, 1985. In the event Buyer fails 
to provide Seller with finish specifications by such time, Seller 
shall have t&£ right to proceed to finish the Unit in accordance 
with the standard finish options then being offered to purchasers 
of units in the Project. 
7. Closing. The closing of the purchase and sale of the 
Unit shall take place at the offices of Utah Title and Abstract 
Company, 629 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, at a mutally 
agreeable time, which shall be within fifteen (15) days after 
written notice from Seller to Buyer that the Unit is ready for 
occupancy. Readiness for occupancy shall mean that a certificate 
-2-
of occupancy for t*e Unit has/been issued by rhe Salt Lake City |^ 
Building Inspection Division/ At the closing, Seller shall 
deliver to Buyer a Warranty Deed to the Unit and Buyer shall 
deliver to Seller a cashier's check for the balance of the 
purchase price, plus any additional amount due for finish upgrade 
or modifications. Property taxes, insurance and closing fees shall 
be'prorated' izrthe usual'fashion as of-the date of-closing.. Also 
Seller shall furnish to Buyer at Seller's expense'a title 
insurance policy from a reputable title insurance company insuring 
title to the Unit in Buyer in the amount of the purchase price 
Title to the Unit shall be in the following name(s): 
John I. Margetts and Irma W. JIargptts, Joint Tenants , ^ ; 
i a/fas' kf**+i A++/p*j****A*& 0^0m^u^*^y TP G'tJ^* 
8. Default. If thcTpart&es fail to close'as set forth""' 
herein through the fault of Buyer/ Buyer shall forfeit all rights 
hereunder and shall have no claim against Seller, whether for 
payment of any portion of the credit granted to Buyer against the 
purchase price or for any other thing or amount. If there is a 
delay in closing through the fault of Seller, Buyer shall be 
entitled at his option to enforce this Agreement as written or to 
select another available condominium unit of an equal or greater 
value in place of the Unit, in which case Buyer shall receive a 
credit against the purchase price of such other unit in the same 
amount as the credit provided herein. 
9. Assignment. This Agreenutrii; sha ,11 line 11: ee Jy 
assignable by either party hereto. 
10. Broker's Fees. Both parties represent and warrant 
that no real estate broker has been involved in this transaction 
and each party agrees to indemnify the other against any claims 
for real estate commissions or finders fees or the like as a 
result of the acts or omissions of such party. 
11. Survival. The parties understand and agree that all 
representations and warranties made herein are true and effective 
both when made and as of the closing, and that all such 
representations and warranties shall survive the closing. 
12 Binding Effect. This Agreement shall inure to the 
benefit of and be binding upon the parties and their respective 
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns. 
13. Counterpart Originals. For the convenience of the 
parties, this Agreement shall be executed in two (2) cour. erpart 
originals, which taken together shall constitute a single 
agreement. 
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14. Notice. Any notice provided for by this Agreement 
shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been given on the 
date on which such notice is either hand delivered to the party to 
whom such notice is directed or is deposited in the United States 
mail as a certified or registered letter, postage prepaid, return 
receipt requested, pr-operly addressed to such party at the address 
specified below: 
If to Seller, at: 
American Savings & Loan Association 
300 North Harrison, 5th Floor 
Stockton, California 95203 
Attn: Real Estate Dept. 
If to Buyer, at: 
John L. Margetts 
2182 Berkeley Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Any such address may be changed by giving notice thereof in 
accordance with the above procedure. 
15. Headings. The headings of the Paragraphs herein 
have been inserted for ease of reference only and shall not 
control or affect the meaning or- interpretation of any of the 
terms and provisions hereof. 
16. Governing Law. This Agreement is entered into under 
and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
17. Further Action. The parties hereby agree to execute 
and deliver such additional documents and to take such further 
action as may become necessary or desirable to fully carry out the 
provisions and intent of this Agreement. 
18. Prior Agreements. This Agreement supersedes any 
prior understandings or agreements between the parties, whether 
written or verbal, respecting the within subject matter, including 
without limitation the aforesaid Settlement Agreement, and 
contains the entire undersanding of the parties with respect 
thereto. 
19. Force Majeure. Seller shall not be deemed to be in 
breach hereof because of any nonperformance due to war, riot or 
other civil disturbance, flood, fire, natural disaster, labor 
strike, or other circumstance beyond the reasonable control of 
Seller. 
2
"".
 E n f
°5 c e r n e n t • l n th« event „„ » dispute between fh. 
parties arising under this Agreement, the party prevailing i? *, 
dispute shall be entitled to recover such fart?'! Sit J fLm \ S U c * 
other party, including without limitation 1 5 5 ?
 0 L d th* 
reasonable attorney's fees. costs ana 
AN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed
 s 
Agreement on the date hereinabove first written. 
SELLER: 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION 
*S 
9009s 
BUXEjR: 
! ^ ^ — 
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AGREEMENT 
IN CONSIDERATION OF and as further inducement to the 
execution and delivery by John L. Margetts ("Margetts") of a 
Condominium Purchase Agreement, Request for Reconveyance and 
General Release, as set forth in that certain Settlement Agreement 
with Americai Savings and Loan Association and Terrace Falls 
Condominiums, dated October /*? , 1984, the undersigned Terrace 
Falls Condominiums and its general and limited partners do hereby 
agree to assign, transfer and convey to Margetts twenty percent 
(20%) of whatever they, or any of them, may ultimately receive, 
if anything, after the closing of the escrow under said Settlement 
Agreement, in the way of an interest in the Terrace Falls 
Condominiums Project or any portion thereof or in any proceeds 
from the sale of the Project or of any unit or interest therein 
or any right or option to acquire such an interest; provided, 
however, the value of what is assigned to Margetts hereunder shall 
not exceed One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-
Three Dollars ($13^*283^00); and provided, further, that except to 
the extent this Agreement may be construed as inconsistent with 
or as a modification of the aforesaid General Release, in which 
case this Agreement shall prevail, said General Release is hereby 
reconfirmed in all respects by Margetts. ^ !~Ssr,f4f>~ccu^^y- >s t^vf 
SIGNED this /T day of November, 1984. " 
TERRACE FALLS < ONDOMI J11 MS 
By: Wells Stevens Enterprises 
Its General Partner 
9 ^ 
By: -^ 
X>-Wells Steven^ 
Its General Partner 
Harold K. Beecher & Associates 
-Harold K. Beecher, President 
) . , . _ • _ . 
Harold K. Beecher, i n d i v i d u a l l y 
Wells Stevens E n t e r p r i s e s 
By: 
I.'"WSlls S t e v e n s , Jr 
General Partner 
Stacey Deve 
MARGETTS: 
<rr*' 
John L. M a r g e t t s , I n d i v i d u a l l y 
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JACK FAIRCLOUGH #1029 
Attorney for Defendant 
242 S. Sandrun Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801) 363 9688 
FILED 
-.. a t 
»Of 
. 0 i* 
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v£ 
(V' T ' _3 >rvur* 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAI T I OKE COUNTY IN THE STATE OMTAH 
\ ^ NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a California Corp., 
successor-in-interest to AMERICAN 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSN., a Califor-
nia corporation, 
vs. 
JOHN L. MARGETTS, 
Defei i d a i it. 
ANSWER km C0UNTERC1 AIM 
Civil No. 890901645 CN 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
In answer to the plaintiff's complaint the defendant admits, denies and 
alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
against the defendant. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defandant responds to paragraphs of the complaint as follows: 
1. rur idLK of knowledn information MJ! ( ;< im' !.,i Tiii'iu ,i lit I if 1 ,r, iu 
the truth thereof denies. 
2. Admits 2, 3. <1. 5. 
3. Ad ?!', ' / , »- u t j l lequs thi' ^".ir.i ! L !'" \ '.o^ rl'-" >nui»\ *> Utah 
partnership,was successor-in-interest to plaintiff; that Terrace Falls acts and 
agreements are binding upon plaintiff; that Terrace Falls and plaintiff entered 
into contemporaneous agreements with defendant which preclude plaintiff's recovery 
herein and denies any liability under the condominium purchase agreement or the 
settlement agreement. 
4. Admits 8. but alleges that he took occupancy of unit 413 in August, 1985 
and he offered to pay dues and charges but plaintiff refused to accept the same 
and plaintiff was not able to properly charge defendant such items until 
September 1, 1987 when an owner's association was formed. 
5. Admits 9. but alleges that plaintiff and defendant negotiated over the 
price, improvements, amount owed and other matters both before and after September 
2, 1987 and the failure to close at all times was the fault of plaintiff. 
6. Denies 10. 
7. For lack of knowledge or information s u f f i c i e n t to form a be l ie f as to 
the t r u t h thereof denies 11 . 12. 
8. Denies 13. 14. 15. 16. 
9. For lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the truth of 18. 
10. As to paragraph 19. see 4. above. 
11. Admits receiving a notice to quit but denies all other allegations of 
20. 
12. Admits he has not vacated the unit but denies all other allegations of 
21. 22. 23. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Defendant denies each and every allegation of the complaint not specifically 
admitted herein. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff and Terrace Falls Condominium, a Utah partnership, acted at all 
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pertinent times herein as successor-in-interest without a foreclosure and as 
co-agents and co-principals with the same attorney representing them and all 
agreements, promises, misrepresentations, fraud, duress and unfair dealing of 
one is binding upon the other and plaintiff is liable for the conduct of itself 
and Terrace Falls to defendant herein and based thereon plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover from defendant. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
On November 14, 1984 plaintiff, by and through Terrace Falls Condominium, 
entered into an Agreement with defendant in which defendant was entitled to a 
20% credit toward the purchase price of unit 413 of all sales of units up to 
$134,283.00. The sale of the first seven units provided a credit to the defen-
dant of a sum exceeding his purchase price. Plaintiff did not choose to sell 
any units until on or about April, 1987 and by September 1, 1987 seven units 
were sold thus there is an accord and satisfaction as to any debts plaintiff 
now alleges against defendant. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Defendant entered upon unit 413 at the instance and request of plaintiff. 
Plaintiff on and after defendants occupation dismissed six security guards for 
the premises. Plaintiff also solicited defendant to sell units to friends and 
defendant sold eight units, six of which were consummated. Defendant is 
entitled to a set off in an amount to be determined at trial for a reasonable 
sales commission and for security guard cost savings plus interest to be 
applied against any amount plaintiff might be entitled to herein against defen-
dant. Further, at the instance and request of plaintiff, defendant sought and 
secured a buyer of the project for the plaintiff in the spring of 1986 in the 
form of the Teamsters Union at a price determined by plaintiff as $15,000,000.00. 
The sum of $150,000.00 or 1% of such total had to be paid. Defendant personally 
GOf'tZQ 
paid the Teamsters $75,000.00 for half of the downpayment. Defendant is 
entitled to set off his said payment plus a reasonable payment for his efforts 
in seeking to find a buyer for the project for plaintiff at plaintiff's request. 
When plaintiff moved into unit 413 in August, 1985 said unit was not complete. 
Plaintiff requested that defendant take occupancy despite its unfinished state 
and promised to reimburse defendant for all completion costs. Such costs 
expended by defendant are approximately $16,000.00. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff engaged in improper conduct amounting to duress to force 
defendant to surrender his trust deed lien against the project's real property 
and to enter into a condominium purchase agreement at an unfair price. Defendant 
had effectively paid plaintiff by August, 1985 in excess of $500,000.00 for 
unit 413. Defendant was coerced into entering into a new condominium purchase 
agreement November 14, 1984 through improper and untrue threats that defendant 
had no valid trust deed lien on the real property of the project and as such 
was worthless,defendant had no rights and had to enter into a new agreement of 
purchase despite payment at that time of more than $400,000.00 in 1984. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has waived and/or is estopped from asserting claims herein against 
defendant. The agreements relied upon by plaintiff in the complaint were 
procured by fraud, deceit, coercion and duress from defendant. In addition to 
the duress referred to above plaintiff's counsel fraudulently represented and 
promised defendant on and before November 14, 1984 that the 20% credit allowed to 
defendant for unit sales up to $134,283.00 would insure defendant would have 
unit 413 entirely paid for as to said balance from such credits. 
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NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's conduct herein discloses unfair dealing, over-reaching, duress 
and fraud as well as a breach of fiduciary duties imposed upon banking institutions 
with respect to those obtaining credit, contracts or services from such banking 
institutions and plaintiff is precluded from recovery against defendant and 
defendant is entitled to costs and attorneys fees herein. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is in breach of express or implied contracts and express or implied 
warranties running in favor of the defendant and as a consequence the claims of 
plaintiff herein are barred. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff made false and fraudulent misrepresentations of existing material 
facts to defendant which defendant relied upon and which he had a right to rely 
upon and without such misrepresentations defendant would not have signed the 
documents plaintiff relies upon and hence plaintiff is barred from any recovery 
against defendant herein. Such representations were made on and before November 
14, 1984 to the effect that defendant had no valid lien on the real property 
cone erned, he had no rights to a credit for $294,000.00 already paid which, with 
an allowed inflation factor, meant by said date plaintiff owed defendant a credit 
of more than $400,000.00 and that in any event defendant would have to make no 
payments on the balance of $134,283.00 on unit 413 because all of such sum would 
be paid out of 20% credit accruing to defendant out of unit sales, which by 
September 1, 1987 exceeded said balance. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
The law firm of FABIAN & CLENDENIN, which brings this action against 
defendant, represented the defendant with respect to his trade of a Park City 
condominium to Terrace Falls and to defendant's filing of a lien against the 
real property concerned herein. Advise was given to defendant by Narrvel Hall, 
Glen Clark and Jay Holdsworth during 1979 and 1980 in this matter and as a result 
defendant obtained a trust deed and recorded same as a lien against the project 
land arising out of his Park City Condominium trade to plaintiff. On said issues 
defendant conferred with Mr. Hall on April 16 and 17, 1979 and with Glen Clark 
and Mr. Hall April 28, 30, May 3, 4 and 7, 1979 and with Mr. Holdsworth on at 
least two other occasions. The listing of appointments kept is not exhaustive 
and others occurred. Defendant was billed for such appointments and paid the 
fees. On this basis the firm of Fabian & Clendenin should be disqualified from 
proceeding herein against defendant and defendant moves for such disqualification. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the complaint herein be dismissed with prejud-
ice and that he recover his costs and a resasonable attorneys fee and such other 
and further relief as to the court appears proper. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For counterclaim defendant alleges as follows: 
1. On or about October, 1980 defendant traded a Park City Condominium to 
Garden Falls Condominiums, a Utah limited partnership, whereby defendant would be 
entitled to a condominium in the Garden Falls Condominiums when the project was 
completed. Defendants condominium in Park City was taken at a value of $249,000. 
00 and this was to be increased by an annual inflation factor. This value had 
grown to over $400,000.00 by November 14, 1984 and to approximately $500,000.00 
by August, 1985. Condominium Sale Agreement. Exhibit 1 hereto. 
2. Garden Falls Condominiums changed its name to Terrace Falls Condominiums 
and on or about December 22, 1981 Terrace Falls gave a trust deed to defendant 
covering the real property concerned herein. Exhibit 2. Said trust deed was 
duly recorded by defendant as a valid lien against said property. The trust 
deed, recording and trade were undertaken upon advice from Fabian & Clendenin 
in 1979 and 1980 as previously stated herein. 
3. Defendant is informed and believes and therefore alleges that plaintiff 
had loaned Terrace Falls funds for the construction of the condominiums and 
Terrace Falls defaulted on such loans. Plaintiff determined in its own best 
interests to not foreclose Terrace Falls rights and interests and those of 
defendant but agreed to take deeds in lieu of foreclosure from Terrace Falls 
leaving intact defendants lien rights on the property and defendants rights to 
a condominium when the project was completed with payment for same being the 
$294,000.00 paid in trade plus an inflation factor, which, by 1984, exceeded 
a value of $400,000.00. 
4. Plaintiff is the successor in interest to Terrace Falls Condominiums 
and is subject to all of defendant's rights against Terrace Falls. 
5. Plaintiff negotiated with defendant as the project was nearing 
completion during September, October and up to November 14, 1984 as to what 
rights defendant had to a unit in the project. 
6. On or about September 12, 1984 Lee Stephens and Gerald Snow, as counsel 
for plaintiff met with defendant. They told defendant that his trust deed lien 
was not valid. They told defendant that neverthless they would allow him a 
credit on a condominium in the project of $30,000.00 which was 10 cents on the 
dollar based on his delivery to Terrace Falls of his Park City condo worth $294, 
000.00. Defendant objected stating the trade was then worth $400,000.00 to 
plaintiff and he should not have to pay anything further to get his unit and deed. 
7. On or about September 14, 1984 defendant met with plaintiff's counsel 
at which time defendant was told they would give him a 50% credit for the 
$294,000.00 already paid or $150,000.00 with no credit for interest or inflation. 
Defendant was told that unit 413 was worth $284,293.00 and with such credit he 
would owe a balance of $134,293.00. Defendant objected saying he had already 
paid $400,000.00 total and he should not have to pay anything further. 
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8. On or about September 14, 1984 plaintiff threatened defendant stating his 
lien was not valid and if he wanted anything out of his trade of a condo to Terrace 
Falls he would have to take the $150,000.00 credit and nothing more. Defendnt said no. 
9. On or about November 14, 1984 defendant met with plaintiff's counsel. 
Defendant was given three documents to sign. One was a general release which 
absolved American, Terrace Falls and partners from any claim by defendant growing 
out of the December 9, 1981 condo trade agreement. Exhibit 3. Defendant was given 
a Condominium Purchase Agreement to sign stating he agreed to buy unit 413 for 
$284,293.00 less $150,000.00 and a balance of $134,283.00. Exhibit 4. A 
settlement agreement between American, Terrace Falls and defendant wherein defend-
ant agreed to the $150,000.00 credit only. Exhibit 5. Defendant refused to sign 
said documents. Plaintiff's counsel then told defendant that, as an extra induce-
ment to get him to sign the three documents he would prepare a document giving 
defendant a 20% credit on sales of all condo units not to exceed $134,283.00. 
Plaintiff's counsel arranged to meet defendant later the same day to sign the 20% 
agreement and the other three referred to herein. 
10. Later in the day on November 14, 198 defendant met with plaintiff's 
counsel again. Said counsel gave defendant an agreement to sign which provided 
defendant would receive credit for 20% of unit sales up to $134,283.00. Exhibit 
6. When plaintiff's counsel handed this document to defendant he said you won't 
have to worry about making any payments on the $134,283.00 balance stated for unit 
413 because the sale of the first seven units by plaintiff would pay all of such 
sum. Based upon such representations to defendant the defendant signed all 
documents at the same time including the gener al release, the condo purchase 
agreement, the settlement agreement and the 20% agreement. When these 
documents were signed by defendant they were not dated. On the defendant's 
copy of the agreement as to the 20% plaintiff's counsel wrote the following: 
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"Condominium Purchase Agreement of even 
date with American Savings and Loan 
Association not to be delivered to 
Terrace Falls Condominiums unless this 
Agreement is delivered to John Margetts 
simultaneously." 
Plaintiff's counsel prepared all of the documents and negotiated with 
defendant. Plaintiff's counsel later had the four documents executed by the 
parties other than the defendant. The defendant left Salt Lake City for 
California on November 15, 1984 and he did not return to Salt Lake City until 
November 26, 1984. Plaintiff through counsel or otherwise wrote November 19, 
1984 on the settlement agreement but it was blank as to date when the defendant 
executed it. The dates of November 14, 1984 have been written by plaintiff on 
the general release, the agreement as to 20% and the condo purchase agreement. 
11. Defendant executed the release, settlement and condo purchase 
agreement in reliance on the plaintiff's representations as to the 20% credit 
agreement. 
12. At the instance and request of plaintiff, defendant moved into unit 413 
on or about August 25, 1985. Defendant met with plaintiff's representative in 
August, 1985 and he was told that plaintiff would negotiate the sale price of 
$284,283.00 because defendant pointed out units being sold by plaintiff then in 
Salt Lake City were going for $150,000.00 or less and such units were as big as 
unit 413. Plaintiff not only said the unit price would be negotiated but that 
it wanted him to move in and finish the unit. Defendant has spent $16,000.00 
to do so. 
13. When defendant moved in plaintiff dismissed their six security guards as 
not being needed any longer due to his presence. 
14. Plaintiff urged defendant to find buyers for units and he found eight, 
six of whom consummated purchases. 
15. At the request of plaintiff defenant found a buyer for the project for 
some $15,000,000.00 and snpnt $75,000.00 nf his own funds in Hm'nn sn. 
ID. 5even units in tne lerrace ha u s condominium were sold from on or 
about April, 1987 to September 1, 1987. No effort was made by plaintiff to sell 
units, except for the first three, until the former date. The owner's associatior 
was not formed until the latt er date and no dues or fees could be paid by 
defendant prior to that time. In any event plaintiff never demanded payment of 
taxes, dues, rent or anything else until approximately January, 1988. 
FIRST CLAIM 
17. Defendant has an agreement with plaintiff dated November 14, 1984 
under which defendant is entitled to 20% of unit sales up to $134,283.00. Such 
sum was fully credited and earned by September 1, 1987. Plaintiff is therefore 
bound under its agreement to deliver to defendant a deed to unit 413 without 
further payment. 
SECOND CLAIM 
18. Defendant was induced by the fraud and dece ption of plaintiff to 
surrender his lien rights in the property and to agree to pay an additional 
$134,283.00 for unit 413 notwithstanding his prior payment for such unit 
amounted to more than $400,000.00 as of November, 1984. 
19. Defendant relied upon plaintiff's misrepresentations and promises 
as to existing material facts and was thus induced to surrender a valid lien 
and to pay additional funds and without such misrepresentations and reliance he 
would not have executed the release, settlement or purchase agreement. 
THIRD CLAIM 
20. Defendant is entitled to credits, set offs and sums due from the 
plaintiff in amounts to be determined at trial for security services rendered 
to plaintiff from August, 1985 to the present; for costs of finishing unit 413 
of approximately $16,000.00; for services rendered in finding six buyers for the 
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plaintiff wherein such sales were consummated and for two others not consummated 
through no fault of defendant and for services rendered in seeking and finding a 
buyer for plaintiff for the entire project and for defendant's expenditure of 
$75,000.00 in such endeavor plus interest. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays judgment against plaintiff as follows: 
FIRST CLAIM 
1. For judgment requiring plaintiff to deliver to defendant a warranty 
deed without the payment of any further funds by defendant. 
2. For his attorneys fees and costs. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears proper. 
SECOND CLAIM 
1. For a judgment requiring plaintiff to deliver to defendant a warranty 
deed to unit 413 without payment of further funds by defendant. 
2. For his attorneys fees and costs. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears proper. 
THIRD CLAIM 
1. For a judgment awarding to defendant the following: 
a. a reasonable sum to compensate defendant for his expenses in 
finishing unit 413 of approximately $16,000.00. 
b. a reasonable sum to compensate defendant for his efforts in finding 
eight buyers for plaintiff of units, six of which were consummated. 
c. awarding to defendant the value of his services as to security 
which services enabled the plaintiff to dismiss six security guards when defendant 
took occupancy of unit 413. 
d. awarding to defendant the value of his services in finding a buyer 
for the project and to compensate him for his loss of $75,000.00 plus interest 
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in the process. 
2. for defendant's attorneys fees and costs. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court appears proper. 
Dated this 6th day of April, 1989. 
Attorney for Defendant 
>42 South Sandrun Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing answer and 
counterclaim was mailed on the 6th day of April, 1989 to W. Cullen Battle, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, attorneys at law, twelfth floor, 215 South State St., 
Salt Lake City, Utah, U.S. postage prepaid. 
ick Fairclough 
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